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ABSTRACT
Coverage analysis plays an important role in the software testing
process. More recently, the remarkable effectiveness of coverage
feedback has triggered wide interest in feedback-guided fuzzing.
In this work, we introduce bcov, a tool for binary-level coverage
analysis. Our tool statically instruments x86-64 binaries in the ELF
format without compiler support. We implement several techniques
to improve efficiency and scale to large real-world software. First,
we bring Agrawal’s [1] probe pruning technique to binary-level
instrumentation and effectively leverage its super blocks to reduce
overhead. Second, we introduce sliced microexecution, a robust tech-
nique for jump table analysis which improves CFG precision and
enables us to instrument jump table entries. Additionally, smaller
instructions in x86-64 pose a challenge for inserting detours. To
address this challenge, we aggressively exploit padding bytes and
systematically host detours in neighboring basic blocks.
We evaluate bcov on a corpus of 95 binaries compiled from eight
popular and well-tested packages. Two instrumentation policies,
with different edge-level precision, are applied to all functions in
this corpus - more than 1.6 million functions. Our precise policy
has an average performance and memory overheads of 14% and
22% respectively. Instrumented binaries do not introduce any test
regressions. Finally, our jump table analysis is comparable to that
of IDA Pro on gcc binaries and outperform it on clang binaries.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and de-
bugging; • Security and privacy→ Software reverse engineering.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Code coverage analysis is commonly used throughout the software
testing process [2]. Structural coverage metrics such as statement
and branch coverage can inspire confidence in a program under
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test (PUT), or at least identify untested code [20, 21]. Additionally,
coverage analysis has demonstrated its usefulness in test suite
reduction [41], fault localization [30], and detection of compiler
bugs [26]. Moreover, certain coverage requirements are mandated
by the standards in safety-critical domains [16, 22].
In recent years, feedback-guided fuzzing has emerged as a suc-
cessful method for automatically discovering software bugs and se-
curity vunlerabilities [8, 32, 34, 42]. Notably, AFL [43] has pioneered
the usage of code overage as a generic and effective feedback sig-
nal. This success inspired a fuzzing “renaissance” and helped move
fuzzing to industrial-scale adoption like in Google’s OSS-Fuzz [29].
In this work, we introduce bcov, a tool for binary-level coverage
analysis using static binary instrumentation. bcov works directly
on x86-64 binaries in the ELF format without compiler support. It
implements a trampoline-based approach where it inserts probes in
targeted locations to track basic block coverage. Each probe consists
of a detour that diverts control flow to a designated trampoline.
The latter updates coverage data using a single pc-relative mov
instruction, potentially executes relocated instructions, and then
restores control flow back to its original state. Making this scheme
to work transparently with low overhead on large and well-tested
C and C++ programs required addressing several challenges:
Probe pruning (§3). Instrumenting all basic blocks (BBs) can be
inefficient, or even impossible, in x86-64 ISA due to its instruction-
size variability. We adopt the probe pruning technique proposed by
Agrawal [1] where dominator relationships between BBs are used to
group them in super blocks (SBs). SBs are arranged in a super block
dominator graph. Basically, covering a single BB implies that all BBs
in the same SB are also covered in addition to SBs dominating the
current SB. This allows us to significantly reduce instrumentation
overhead and size of coverage data.
Precise CFG analysis (§4). Imprecision in the recovered control
flow graph (CFG) can cause false positives in the reported coverage.
It can also cause instrumentation errors which lead to crashes in a
PUT. To address this challenge, we propose sliced microexecution,
a precise and robust technique for jump table analysis. Also, we
implement a non-return analysis which eliminates spurious CFG
edges after non-return calls. Our experiments show that bcov can
outperform IDA Pro, the leading industry disassembler.
Static instrumentation (§5). Given a set of BBs in a SB, we need
to choose the best BB to probe based on the expected overhead of
restoring control flow. We make this choice using a classification of
BBs in x86-64 into 9 types. Also, some BBs can be too short to insert
a detour. Their size is less than 5 bytes. We address this challenge by
(1) aggressively exploiting padding bytes, (2) instrumenting jump
table entries, and (3) introducing a greedy strategy for detour hosting
where a larger BB can host the detour of a neighboring short BB.
Combining these techniques with probe pruning enables tracking
coverage of virtually all BBs.
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Figure 1: The general workflow of bcov. A binary is patched with
extra code segment (trampolines) and data segment (coverage data).
Our bcov-rt library dumps the data segment at run-time. In our pro-
totype, reporting coverage requires re-analyzing the binary.
Figure 1 depicts the workflow of bcov. Given an ELF module as
input, bcov first analyzes module-level artifacts, such as the call
graph, before moving to function-level analyses to build the CFG
and dominator graphs. Then, bcov will choose appropriate probe
locations and estimate the required code and data sizes depending
on the instrumentation policy chosen by the user. Our prototype
supports two instrumentation policies. The first is a complete cov-
erage policy where for any test input it is possible to precisely
identify covered BBs. The second one is a heuristic coverage policy
where we probe only the leaf SBs in the super block dominator
graph. Running a test suite that covers all leaf SBs implies that 100%
code coverage is reached. We refer to these policies as any-node
and leaf-node policies respectively. On average, the any-node policy
probes 46% of BBs compared to 30% in the leaf-node policy. Average
performance overheads are 14% and 8% respectively.
The patching phase can start after completing the previous anal-
ysis phase. Here, bcov first extends the ELF module by allocating
two loadable segments. A code segment where trampolines are
written and a data segment for storing coverage data. Then, bcov
iterates over all probes identified by the chosen instrumentation
policy. Each probe represents a single SB. Generally, patching a
probe requires inserting a detour targeting a corresponding trampo-
line. We use pc-relative jmp or call detours. The trampoline first
updates coverage data and then restores control flow back to its
state in the original module as depicted in Figure 2.
The data segment has a simple format consisting of a small
header and a byte array that is initialized to zeros. Setting a byte
to one indicates that its corresponding SB is covered. It is trivial to
compress this data on disk as only the LSB of each byte is used. For
example, this enables storing complete coverage data of llc (LLVM
backend) in 65KB only. 1 The data format also enables merging
coverage data of multiple tests using a simple bitwise OR operation.
Dumping coverage data requires linking against bcov-rt, our
small runtime library. Alternatively, bcov-rt can be injected using
the LD_PRELOAD mechanism in order to avoid modifying the build
system. Coverage data can be dumped on process shutdown or
upon receiving a user signal. The latter enables online coverage
1The binary has around a million BBs which contain more than 4 × 106 instructions.
36b62: cmp eax,0x140
36b67: sete al
36b6a: jmp 36bce
(a) original code
36b62: cmp eax,0x140
36b67: jmp 6002b8
(b) patched code
6002b8: mov BYTE PTR [rip+0xadd88],1
6002bf: sete al
6002c2: jmp 0x36bce
(c) trampoline
Figure 2: bcov patching example. (a) instruction at 0x36b67must be
relocated as the jump at 0x36b6a is only two byte size. (b) relocated
instructions are replaced with a 5 byte detour at 0x36b67. (c) cover-
age update happens at 0x6002b8. Control flow is then restored after
executing the relocated instruction at 0x6002bf.
tracking of long-running processes. Note that the data segment
starts with a magic number which allows bcov-rt to identify it.
This design makes bcov achieve three main goals, namely, trans-
parency, performance, and flexibility. Program transparency is
achieved by not modifying program stack, heap, nor any general-
purpose register. Also, coverage update requires a single pc-relative
mov instruction which has a modest performance overhead. Finally,
bcov works directly on the binary without compiler support and
largely without changes to the build system. This enables users to
flexibly adapt their instrumentation policy without recompilation.
To summarize, we make the following key contributions:
• We are the first to bring Agrawal’s probe pruning technique
to binary-level instrumentation. We show that its super
blocks can be effectively leveraged to optimize probe se-
lection and reduce coverage data.
• We introduce sliced microexecution, a robust method for jump
table analysis. It significantly improves CFG precision and
allows us to instrument jump table entries.
• We significantly push the state of the art in trampoline-based
static instrumentation and show that it can be used to track
code coverage efficiently and transparently.
We implemented our contributions in bcov which we make pub-
licly available: https://github.com/abenkhadra/bcov.
We extensively experimented with bcov. In this respect, we se-
lected 8 popular and well-tested subjects such as ffmpeg and llc.
We compiled them using 4 recent major versions of gcc and clang at
3 different optimization levels each. In total, we used bcov to instru-
ment 95 binaries and more than 1.6 million functions. Instrumented
binaries did not introduce any test regressions.
2 MOTIVATION
There is a plethora of tools dedicated to coverage analysis. They
vary widely in terms of goals and features. Therefore, we motivate
the need for our approach via a comparison with a representative
set of popular tools. Our discussion is based on Table 1.
We start with source-level tools supported in gcc and clang,
namely, gcov and llvm-cov respectively. They track similar artifacts
such as statement coverage. The key difference is in the perfor-
mance of instrumented binaries. gcov relies on debug information
which are less accurate in optimized builds. In comparison, llvm-cov
features a custom mapping format embedded in LLVM’s intermedi-
ate representation (IR). This allows it to cope better with compiler
optimizations. In addition, this mapping format tracks source code
regions with better precision compared to gcov.
Efficient Binary-Level Coverage Analysis Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Le
ve
l
Co
ve
ra
ge
go
al Co
m
pi
ler
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
ov
er
he
ad
Fle
xib
ili
ty
Us
ab
ili
ty
gcov source complete ✕ ✕ ✕ ✓
llvm-cov source complete ✕ ✓ ✕ ✓
sancov IR heuristic ✕ n/a ✕ ✓
Intel PT binary heuristic ✓ ✓ ✕ ✕
drcov binary both ✓ ✕ ✓ ✕
bcov binary both ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: A comparison with representative coverage analysis tools.
Compiler-dependent tools require modifying the build system and
recompilation which limits flexibility. The usability of binary-level
tools in the testing workflow is limited. In contrast, bcov only re-
quires replacing a binary with an instrumented version.
The ability of a binary-level tool such as bcov to report source-
level artifacts is limited by the binary-to-source mapping available.
Off-the-shelf debug information can be used to report statement
coverage - the most important artifact in practice [20, 23]. In this
setting, bcov offers several advantages including: (1) detailed view
of individual branch decisions regardless of the optimization level,
(2) precise handling of non-local control flow such as longjmp and
C++ exception handling, and (3) flexibility in instrumenting only a
selected set of functions, e.g., the ones affected by recent changes,
which is important for the efficiency of continuous testing [23].
The recent fuzzing renaissance has motivated the need to im-
prove efficiency by heuristically tracking coverage. SanitizerCover-
age (sancov) [33] is a pass built into LLVMwhich supports collecting
various types of feedback signals including basic block coverage. It
is used in prominent fuzzers like LibFuzzer [27] and Honggfuzz [36].
The performance overhead of sancov is not directly measurable as
the usage model varies significantly between sancov users. Also,
sancov is tightly coupled with LLVM sanitizers (e.g., ASan) which
add varying overhead. Extending bcov with additional feedback
signals, similar to sancov, is an interesting future work.
Hardware instruction tracing mechanisms, like Intel® PT (IPT),
can also be used for coverage analysis. However, IPT can dump
gigabytes of compressed trace data within seconds which can be in-
efficient to store and post-process. In our experiments, IPT dumped
6.5GB trace data for a libxerces test that lasts only 5 seconds. Post-
processing and deduplication took more than 3 hours. In compar-
ison, our tool can produce an accurate coverage report for the
same test after processing a 53KB dump in few seconds. Schumilo
et al. [34] propose to heuristically summarize IPT data on the fly
and thus avoid storing the complete trace.
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) tools can report binary-
level coverage using dedicated clients (plug-ins) like drcov. DBI
tools act as a process virtual machine which JIT emits instructions
to a designated code cache. This process is complex and may break
binaries. Moreover, JIT optimizations add overhead to the whole
program even if we are only interested in a selected part like a
shared library. Our evaluation includes a comparison with the pop-
ular DBI tools Pin [31] and DynamoRIO [9].
3 PROBE PRUNING
We provide here the necessary background on the probe pruning
techniques implemented in bcov based on Agrawal [1]. The original
work considered source-level pruning but only for C programs.
Given a function F with a set of basic blocks B connected in a
CFG. The straightforward way to obtain complete coverage data
is to probe every basic block bb ∈ B. However, it is possible to
significantly reduce the number of required probes by comput-
ing dominance relationships between basic blocks in a CFG. We
say that bbi predominates bbj , bbi
pre−−−⇁ bbj , iff every path from
function entry (EN ) to bbj goes through bbi . Similarly, bbi post-
dominates bbj , bbi
post−−−−⇁ bbj , iff every path from bbj to func-
tion exit (EX ) goes through bbi . We say that bbi dominates bbj
iff bbi
pre−−−⇁ bbj ∨ bbi post−−−−⇁ bbj . The predominator and postdom-
inator relationships are represented by the trees Tpre and Tpost
respectively. The dominator graph (DG) is a directed graph that
captures all dominance relationships. It is obtained by union of
both trees DG = Tpre ∪Tpost , i.e, by merging edges of both trees.
Given a dominator graph and the fact that a particular bb is cov-
ered, this implies that all dominators (predecessors) of bb in DG are
also covered. This allows us to avoid probing basic blocks that do
not increase our coverage information. However, we are interested
in moving a step further by leveraging strongly-connected compo-
nents (SCCs) in the DG. Each SCC represents a super block, a set of
basic blocks with equivalent coverage information. The super block
dominator graph (SB-DG) is constructed by merging SCCs in the
DG. That is, each node SB in SB-DG represents a SCC in the DG. An
edge is inserted between SBi and SBj iff ∃ bb ∈ SBi ,∃ bb ′ ∈ SBj
where bb dominates bb ′.
Constructing a SB-DG has a number of benefits. First, it is a
convenient tool to measure the coverage information gained from
probing any particular basic block. Second, it enables compressing
coverage data by tracking super blocks instead of individual basic
blocks. Finally, it provides flexibility in choosing the best basic block
to probe in a super block. We show later in section 5.1 how this
flexibility can be leveraged to reduce instrumentation overhead.
We implemented two instrumentation policies in bcov, namely,
leaf-node and any-node. We discuss them based on the example
depicted in Figure 3. In the leaf-node policy, we instrument only
the leafs of the SB-DG. Covering all such leaf nodes implies that
all nodes in SB-DG are also covered, i.e., achieving 100% coverage.
However, this coverage percentage is usually infeasible in practice.
Nevertheless, leaf nodes still provide high coverage information
whichmake the leaf-node policy useful to approximate the coverage
of a test suite at a relatively low overhead.
Generally, we are also interested in inferring the exact set of cov-
ered basic blocks given any test input. This is usually not possible
in the leaf-node policy. For example, given an input that visits the
path A→ C → B → H → G, the leaf-node policy can report that
the covered set is {B,H ,G}. However, this policy can make no state-
ment about the coverage ofA andC since they do not dominate the
visited probe in H . We address this problem in the any-node policy.
The set of super blocks instrumented in this policy is a super set
of those in the leaf-node policy. More precisely, Sany = Sleaf
⋃
Sc .
Sc represents the set of critical super blocks in the sense that each
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Figure 3: An example CFG and its corresponding SB-DG. First,
pre-domominator and post-dominator trees are constructed and
merged in a dominator graph (DG). SCCs in DG represent nodes in
SB-DG. In the leaf-node policy, only leaf nodes in SB-DG, namely, D,
E, and H, need to be probed. In the any-node policy, either A or C
need to be additionally probed. EN and EX are virtual nodes com-
monly used to simplify dominance analysis.
sb ∈ Sc can be visited by at least one path in the CFG that does not
visit any of its children in the SB-DG.
It is possible to determine Sc using an O(|V | + |E |) algorithm
where V and E are the nodes and edges in the CFG respectively.
We refer to [1] for further details. In Figure 3, the super block
{B,G} is non-critical. However, the super block {A,C} is critical
and, consequently, will be probed in the any-node policy.
4 CONTROL FLOW ANALYSIS
In this section, we first consider the definition of a function at
binary level. Then, we discuss sliced microexecution, our proposed
method for jump table analysis.
4.1 Function Definitions
The notion of function is important to our approach as it deter-
mines the scope of CFG and, consequently, the correctness of dom-
inance relationships. Functions are well-defined constructs in the
source code. However, compiler optimizations such as function
splitting and inlining significantly change the layout of correspond-
ing binary-level functions.
Fortunately, these optimizations are not of concern to us as long
as well-formed function definitions are given to bcov. A function is
defined by the pair F = (s, z)where s and z are start address and byte
size respectively. A function can have a set of entry and exit points
where control flow enters and leaves the function respectively. We
say that a function definition is well-formed if (1) it does not overlap
with other function definitions, and (2) all of its basic blocks are
reachable only through its entries.
Definitions source. Our tool uses linker symbols as a source
of well-formed function definitions. These symbols, unlike debug
symbols, are available by default in all builds. In stripped binaries,
bcov can read function definitions from call-frame information (CFI)
records which can be found in the .eh_frame section. This section
stores the data necessary for stack unwinding and is part of the
loadable image of the binary, i.e., is not stripped. These records
must be available to enable C++ exception handling. However, they
are typically available in C binaries as well since they are needed
for crash reporting among other tasks.
Note that CFI records might not contain all the functions that are
defined in linker symbols. For example, developers might exclude
CFI records of leaf functions to save memory. However, we empiri-
cally observed that function definitions in CFI records largely match
those found in linker symbols. Additionally, in the unlikely case
where CFI records are unavailable, we may still resort to function
identification techniques such as [5, 6].
Function entries. The main entry of a function is trivially de-
fined by its start address. Other functions can either call or tail-call
only the main entry. We have empirically validated this assump-
tion in our dataset. That is, we have not found any instance where
a (direct) function call targets an internal basic block in another
function. However, non-local control transfer mechanisms, such as
longjmp and exception handling, violate this assumption. We refer
to possible targets of non-local control transfer as auxilary function
entries. Such entries are not dominated by, or even unreachable
from, the main function entry. Auxilary entries of longjmp are
identified during CFG construction. They are simply the successor
of each basic block that calls setjmp.
The identification of auxiliary entries used in exception handling
is more elaborate. The Itanium C++ ABI specifies the exception
handling standard used in modern Unix-like systems. Of interest
to us in this specification is the landing pad which is a code sec-
tion responsible for catching, or cleaning up after, an exception. A
function can have several landing pads, e.g., it can catch exceptions
of different types. We consider each landing pad to be an auxiliary
entry. Collecting landing pad addresses requires bcov to iterate over
all CFI records in the .eh_frame section. More specifically, bcov
examines all Frame Description Entry (FDE) records looking for
a pointer to a language-specific data area (LSDA). If such pointer
exists, then bcov would parse the corresponding LSDA to extract
landing pad addresses.
Function exits. Our tool analyzes the CFG to identify the basic
blockswhere control flow leaves a function.We take two parameters
into consideration (1) the type of the control-transfer instruction
which can be jmp, call, or ret, and (2) whether it is a direct or
indirect instruction. A jmp targeting another function is a tail-call
and generally also an exit point. However, the jump table analysis
in section 4.2 can determine that certain indirect jmp are actually
intra-procedural, i.e., local to the function. On the other hand, a
call typically returns, i.e, is not an exit point, except for calls to
non-return functions. The non-return analysis implemented in bcov
is responsible for identifying such functions. Finally, we consider
all ret instructions to be exit points.
Our model of a function occupying a contiguous code region
is simple; yet, we found it to be consistent with our large dataset.
Moreover, it can be augmented with additional analyses to identify
function entries and exits. This provides enough flexibility to handle
special situations that might arise in practice. For example, using
ret to implement indirect calls in Retpoline [38].
4.2 Jump Table Analysis
Recovering the targets of indirect control transfer instructions is
desirable in several applications such as control flow integrity. How-
ever, this problem is undecidable in general which means that we
can only hope for approximate solutions. Nevertheless, the switch
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Hypothesis Action
(1) Depends on constant base address? if yes test (2)
else abort
(2) Is constrained by a bound condition? if yes test (3)
else assume (4)
(3) Bound condition dominates jump table? if yes do recovery
else assume (4)
(4) Assume jump table is data-bounded do recovery and
try to falsify
Table 2: Hypotheses tested, or falsified, to analyze a jump table.
Backward slicing answers (1)-(3). Microexecution is used to falsify
hypotheses and recover the jump table.
statement in C/C++ remains amenable to precise analysis. It is com-
monly implemented as an indirect jmp that is based on a bounded
variable which indexes into a lookup-table.
The analysis of such jump tables enable us to (1) increase CFG
precision, (2) instrument jump table data, and (3) avoid disassembly
errors. The latter issue is relevant to architectures such as ARM
where compilers inline jump table data in the code section. Fortu-
nately, such data typically reside in a separate read-only section in
x86-64 which enables correct disassembly using linear sweep [4].
The analysis of jump tables can be challenging as compilers
enjoy a lot of flexibility in implementing switch statements. A
jump table can be control-bounded by checking the value of the
index against a bound condition. Alternatively, should expected
values be dense, e.g., many values below 16, the compiler might
prefer a data-bounded jump table, e.g, using a bitwise and with
0xf. Additionally, compilers are free to divide a switch with many
case labels into multiple jump tables. Our goal in this analysis is to
recover information about each individual jump table. This includes
its control flow targets and total number of entries.
To this end, we propose sliced microexecution, a novel method
for jump table analysis which combines classical backward slicing
with microexecution [19]. The latter refers to the ability to emu-
late any code fragment without manual inputs. Basically, for each
indirect jmp in a function, bcov attempts to test the sequence of hy-
potheses depicted in Table 2. If they are invalid then bcov aborts the
analysis and consider this jmp to be a tail-call. Otherwise, bcov pro-
ceeds with the actual recovery depending on the type of jump table
which can generally either be control-bounded or data-bounded.
We discuss this method based on the example shown in Fig-
ure 4. First, bcov has to test hypothesis (1) by backward slicing
from 0x9f719 until it reaches instruction at 0x9f712 which has
a memory dependency. This dependency has base address in r15.
So is this base address constant? Backward slicing for r15 shows
that it is in fact a constant. Note that a jump table should depend
on a single variable used as index. The base address is a constant
determined at compile time.
We move now to test hypothesis (2). It is tested by spawning
a condition slicer upon encountering each conditional jmp, .e.g,
instruction at 0x9f707. This slicer is used to check whether the
variable influencing the bound condition is also the jump table
index. This is the case in our example at 0x9f6f0 where the value
in r12b influences both the condition at 0x9f707 and the jump
9f6a1: lea r15,[rip+0xe69e4] ; set table base
.
9f6f0: movzx eax,r12b ; index is r12b
9f6f4: cmp r12b,0x5b ; bound comparison
9f6f8: mov QWORD PTR [rsp+0x8],rax
9f6fd: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbx]
9f700: mov r13,QWORD PTR [rax+0x10]
9f704: mov ecx,r13d
9f707: ja 9f880 ; jump to default case
9f70d: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rsp+0x8]
9f712: movsxd rax,DWORD PTR [r15+rax*4]
9f716: add rax,r15
9f719: jmp rax ; jump to matching case
Figure 4: Jump table example fromperl v5.28 compiledwith gcc v7.3.
Highlighted instructions are not part of the backward slice. The
jump table base is set relatively far at 0x9f6a1.
table index. Now that a bound condition is found we need to test it
against hypothesis (3).
A jump table might be preceded by multiple conditional com-
parisons that depend on the index. We apply heuristics in order to
quickly discard the ones that can not represent a bound condition,
e.g., comparisons with zero. However, there can still be more than
one candidate. Here, we leverage the fact that a bound condition
should dominate the jump table. Otherwise, a path in CFG would
exist where the index value remains unbounded. We check for
dominance during the backward CFG traversal needed for slicing.
Basically, it should not be possible to bypass the bound condition.
Backward slicing produces a slice (code fragment) which cap-
tures the essential instructions affecting the jump table. This slice
represents a univariate block-box function with the index as input
variable. Modifying the index should trigger behavioral changes
especially in the observed jump address at the output. Assuming
that this slice represents a jump table, we reason about its behavior
using microexecution. Also, we try to validate our assumption by
widely varying the index.
Before microexecuting a slice, bcov first loads the binary using
a built-in ELF loader. Then, it initializes a valid memory environ-
ment for the given code slice. For example, it allocates memory
for the pointer [rsp+0x8] and assigns a valid address to rsp. It is
now possible to start “fuzzing” the index. However, the expected
behavior of the slice depends on the type of the jump table.
In control-bounded jump tables, a change in behavior must be
observed in the intervals [0,b) and (b, +∞) where b is the bound
constant. This constant is located in the first instruction that sets
the flags before the bound condition. In our example, this is the
instruction at 0x9f6f4. bcov tests 24 index values in total, 8 of which
are sampled from [0,b] including 0, b − 1, and b. The remaining 16
values increase exponentially, in power of 2, starting from b + 1.
We found this scheme to give us high confidence in the results.
The jump table is expected to target an instruction inside the
current function for most inputs in [0,b). On the other hand, the
jump table should not be reachable for all inputs in (b, +∞). That is,
the bound condition should redirect control flow to the default case.
Should the behavior of the code slice not match what we expect
from a control-bounded jump table, then we abort and assume that
it is data-bounded. Note that we are not strict about the behavior
for input b since the bound condition might check for equality.
Assuming that a given indirect jmp represents a data-bounded
jump table, we need effective techniques to validate our assumption
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and explore the bound limits. To this end, bcov executes the slice 24
times, each time increasing the index exponentially while setting
least significant bits to one. This allow us to explore the bound limits
in the common case of bitwise and with a bit mask like 0xf. Other
bit patterns are also tried in order to better penetrate combinations
of bitwise instructions. Our key insight is that we should not have
full control over the jump target. That is, arbitrary change in the
index should be reflected in a constrained change in the jump target.
Additionally, jump targets need to be located in the current function
similar to the case of control-bounded jump tables. Should the slice
withstand these diverse tests, then we can be highly confident that
it represents a jump table.
Our evaluation shows that sliced microexecution is precise and
robust against various compiler optimizations. It allowed bcov to
reliably recover the jump tables in the core loop of the Python inter-
preter, located in function _PyEval_EvalFrameDefault. Note that
these jump tables are compiled from complex computed gotos. 2
5 STATIC INSTRUMENTATION
In this section, we first consider a strategy to reduce instrumen-
tation overhead by carefully selecting a basic block to probe in a
super block. Then, we discuss handling short basic blocks by means
of hosting their detours in larger neighboring basic blocks.
5.1 Optimized Probe Selection
Generally, probing a BB requires inserting a detour targeting its
designated trampoline. A detour occupies 5 bytes and can either be a
direct jmp or call. Consequently, one or more original instructions
must be relocated to the trampoline. This relocation overhead varies
due to the instruction-size variability in the x86-64. Note that a
pc-relative mov, which occupies 7 bytes, represents an unavoidable
overhead in each trampoline in order to update coverage. Hence,
our goal is to reduce the relocation overhead.
To this end, we iterate over all BBs in a super block and select
the one expected to incur the lowest overhead. First, we have to
establish whether a detour can be accommodated in the first place.
A BB that satisfies s + p < 5 is considered a guest, where s and p
are the byte size and padding size respectively. A super block that
contains only guest BBs is handled via detour hosting (§5.2). Now
we examine the type and size of the last instruction of each BB
and whether the BB is targeted by a jump table. These parameters
are translated into the types depicted in Table 3. These BB types
are organized in a total order. This means, for example, we strictly
prefer a long-call over a long-cond should both exist in the same
super block. This type order is primarily derived from empirical
observation. However, we did not necessarily experiment with all
possible combinations. Preferring long-call over short-call should
be intuitive. The latter incurs an additional overhead for relocating
at least one instruction preceding the call.
We observed that return basic blocks are usually padded (55% on
average). Padding size is often more than 3 bytes which translates
to a relocation overhead of only one byte - the size of a ret instruc-
tion. Also, favoring long-jmp over long-call provided around 3%
improvement in both relocation and performance overheads. On
2Computed gotos is a gcc extension to C which is also supported in clang. It allows
developers to have full control over bound checking in a jump table.
Type RP Relocation overhead
return maybe Can be only 1 byte depending on the padding
long-jump no Size of jmp instruction which is ≥ 5 bytes
long-call no Size of call instruction which is ≥ 5 bytes
jump-tab no Size of jmp instruction to original code (5 bytes)
short-call yes Similar to long-call but with RP overhead added
short-jump yes Similar to long-jump but with RP overhead added
internal maybe Size of relocated instruction(s) inside the BB
long-cond no Rewriting incurs a fixed 11 byte overhead
short-cond yes Similar to long-cond but with RP overhead added
Table 3: BB classification used in probe selection. Types are shown
in ascending order based on expected relocation overhead. The
terms long and short are relative to detour size (5 bytes). Short types
require relocating preceeding (RP) instruction(s).
the other hand, short-call had only a slight advantage over short-
jmp. This might be due to the fixed 2 byte size of the latter, which
leads to relocating more instructions. However, our experiments
were not always conclusive, e.g., between jump-tab and short-call.
Relocating an instruction depends on its relation to the PC
(called rip in x86-64). Position-independent instructions can sim-
ply be copied to the trampoline. However, we had to develop a
custom rewriter for position-dependent instructions. The rewriter
preserves the exact semantics of the original instruction whether it
explicitly or implicitly depends on rip. For example, a long-cond in-
struction will be rewritten in the trampoline to a matching sequence
consisting of a long-cond (6 bytes) and a jmp (5 bytes).
Jump table instrumentation has the unique property of preserv-
ing the original code. It is a data-only mechanism that enables us
to probe even one byte BBs. However, in order to be applicable, a
BB has to be targeted by a patchable jump table. A jump table is
patchable if its entries are either 32-bit offsets or absolute addresses.
We observed that about 92% of more than 46,000 jump tables in
our dataset are patchable. Actually, we found that 8-bit and 16-bit
offsets are only used in libopencv_core.
Finally, our probe selection strategy is effective in reducing re-
location overhead. However, it is not necessarily optimal. We ob-
served high variance in the percentage of padded return, i.e., return
is not always the best choice. Also, a loop-aware strategy might
reduce performance overhead by avoiding loop heads. Such opti-
mizations are left for future work.
5.2 Detour Hosting
The instruction-size variability in x86-64 suggests that some BBs
are simply too short to insert a detour without overwriting the
following BB. In our dataset, we found that about 7% of all BBs
are short (size < 5 bytes). Left without a probe, we risk losing
coverage information of a particular short BB and, potentially, all
of its dominators. One possible solution is to relocate the entire
function to a larger memory area. However, this is costly in terms of
code size and engineering effort. The latter is needed to fix relocated
references. For example, throwing an exception from a relocated
function without fixing its corresponding CFI record will lead to
abrupt process termination.
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The method adopted in bcov is detour hosting. It offers lower
relocation overhead and preserves the stability of code references
at basic block level. Here, the size of a guest BB needs to be at least 2
bytes which is enough to insert a short detour targeting a reachable
host BB, i.e., within about ±128 bytes. The host BB must be large
enough to accommodate two regular detours, i.e., at least 10 bytes.
The first detour targets its own trampoline while the other detours
would target the trampolines of their respective guests. Note that
we can safely overwrite padding bytes of both the guest and host.
Also, the host does not need to be entirely relocated. Relocating a
subset of its instructions might be sufficient.
Figure 5 depicts a detour hosting example. It involves a guest
consisting of an indirect call (3 bytes size). The tricky part about a
call is that the return address must be preserved. A sub instruction
(5 bytes) is used to adjust the return address in the trampoline
from 0xad67fd to its original value of 0xad6803. CPU flags are
also clobbered which should be safe since they are not preserved
across function calls in the x86-64 ABI. Note that this is the only
case were we modify CPU state.
Now we have the following allocation problem: given a guest
д and a set of suitable hosts H = {h1,h2, ..,hn }, find the host hi
whose selection incurs minimal overhead. Moreover, we are also
interested in the more general formulation: given a set of guests
G = {д1,д2, ..,дk } and a set of hosts H = {h1,h2, ..,hn }, where
each host is suitable for at least one guest, find a function mapping
M : G → H such that the overhead is minimal. We approach this
problem using a greedy strategy where we prefer, in this order,
(1) packing more guests in a single host, (2) a host already selected
to be probed over an intact host, (3) a host that is closer to the guest.
Basically, for each guest, we iterate over all reachable BBs. A BB
can offer a hosting offset, if possible. A higher offset means that
more guests are packed in this host. The initial offset is 5 bytes from
start of the host. Should offered offsets be equal, we look into (2)
in order to avoid, as much as possible, relocating otherwise intact
BBs. Finally, should both (1) and (2) be equal, then we look into (3)
in order to have better code cache locality.
Our experiments show that this strategy provides a good balance
in terms of performance and relocation overhead. It achieves a
hosting ratio of 1.2 guests per host on average. Also, it was able of
hosting up to 14 guests in a single host. Around 80% of the hosts
are already probed, i.e., a relocation overhead is expected for them
anyway. Additionally, bcov was able of hosting 94% of the guests.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented our approach in the tool bcov. Our tool accepts an
ELF module as input (executable or shared library). It starts with a
set of module-level analyses such as reading function definitions,
parsing CFI records, and building the call graph. Our non-return
analysis implementation is similar to [28]. We omit the details as
they are not part of our core contribution. Then come function-level
analyses such as building CFG (including jump tables), dominator
trees, and super block dominator graph. Probes are determined
based on the instrumentation policy set be the user. bcov can be
used for patching or coverage reporting. The latter mode requires
a data file dumped from a patched module. The instrumentation
policy used for coverage reporting must match the one used for
ad67f3: jmp ad6803
ad67f5: nop [multi-byte]
ad6800: call QWORD PTR [rax+0x58]
(a) original code
ad67f3: jmp 1d31afa ; jump to relocated host
ad67f8: call 1d31b39 ; hosted detour
ad67fd: nop DOWRD PTR [rax]
ad6800: jmp ad67f8 ; jump to hosted detour
(b) patched code
1d31b39: mov BYTE PTR [rip+0x4f8d01],1
1d31b40: sub QWORD PTR [rsp], -6
1d31b45: jmp QWORD PTR [rax + 0x58]
(c) trampoline
Figure 5: Detour hosting example taken from llc v8.0 compiled with
clang v5.0. (a) host is a short jmp at 0xad67f3 followed by 11 padding
bytes. (b) inserting 2 detours leaves 3 padding bytes. (c) return ad-
dress adjusted at 0x1d31b40. Original call at 0xad6800 is rewritten
to a matching jmp at 0x1d31b45
patching. We implemented the modern SEMI-NCA dominator tree
algorithm [18] and Tarjan’s classical SCC algorithm. We used cap-
stone [11] for disassembly and implemented a wrapper around
unicorn [39] for microexecution. In total, this required about 17,000
LoC in C++ (testing code excluded). The run-time library bcov-rt is
implemented in C in 250 LoC.
7 EVALUATION
Our evaluation is guided by the following research questions:
RQ1 Can bcov transparently scale to real-world binaries?
RQ2 What is the instrumentation overhead in terms of perfor-
mance, memory, and file size?
RQ3 Have we pushed the state of the art in jump table analysis?
RQ4 To what extent can bcov provide better efficiency in compari-
son to its direct alternatives, namely, DBI tools?
RQ5 Can bcov accurately report binary-level coverage?
For our evaluation, we selected eight modules from popular open
source packages offering diverse functionality. They are summa-
rized in Table 4. We compiled each module using four compilers in
three different build types. Specifically, we used the compilers gcc-
5.5, gcc-7.4, clang-5.0, and clang-8.0. This gives us a representative
snapshot of the past three years of developments in gcc and clang
respectively. The build types are debug, release, and lto. The latter
refers to link-time optimizations. Compiler optimizations were dis-
abled in debug builds and enabled in release and lto builds. Enabled
optimizations depend on the default options of their respective
package which can be at levels O2 or O3.
This results in 12 versions of each module and a total of 95 bina-
ries. 3 Our tool was able of patching 88 binaries without modifying
the build system. However, we had to modify the linker script in 7
instances where relocating ELF program headers was not possible.
We instructed the linker to leave 112 bytes, which is enough for
our segments headers, after the original program headers. This
change is small affecting only one line in the linker script. The
bcov-rt runtime was injected using the LD_PRELOAD mechanism.
All experiments were conducted on an Ubuntu 16.04 PC with Intel®
i7-6700 CPU and 32GB of RAM.
RQ1: Scalability and transparency. Our choice of subjects
directly supports our scalability claim. Figure 6 shows a comparison
3Compiling llc with gcc-5.5 in lto build resulted in a compiler crash.
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Module Package Lang. Domain
gas binutils-2.32 C Assemblers
perl perl-5.28.1 C Interpreters
python cpython-3.7.3 C Interpreters
libMagickCore ImageMagick-7.0.8 C Image processing
ffmpeg FFmpeg-4.1.3 C Video processing
libxerces-c-3.2 xerces-c-3.2.2 C++ XML parsing
libopencv_core opencv-4.0.1 C++ Computer vision
llc llvm-8.0.0 C++ Compilers
Table 4: Selected evaluation subjects. Used recent package versions.
in terms of code size relative to objdump, a commonly used subject
in binary analysis research. Note that bcov can analyze and patch llc,
our largest subject, in 30 seconds. In our experiments, we used bcov
to instrument all functions available in the .text section. More
than 1.6× 106 functions have been instrumented across 95 binaries.
The policies leaf-node and any-node have been applied separately,
i.e., subjects were instrumented twice.
Transparency is important in coverage instrumentation. This
practically means that bcov should not introduce regressions. We
evaluated this criterion by replacing original binaries with instru-
mented versions and re-running their test suites. Our instrumen-
tation did not introduce any regressions despite the fact that (1) we
systematically patch all functions even compiler-generated ones,
and (2) our benchmark packages include extensive test suites. For
example, the perl test suite runs over one million checks.
RQ2: Instrumentation overhead. Figure 7 depicts the instru-
mentation overhead relative to original binaries. The average per-
formance overhead of the any-node policy is 14%. The leaf-node
policy is omitted due to the lack of space. The overhead is measured
based on the wall-clock time required to run individual test suites,
.e.g, run “make test” to completion. This covers the overhead as-
sociated with instrumentation and dumping coverage data to disk.
The latter overhead varies depending on the number of processes
spawned during testing. For example, opencv tests are executed
within a single process which dumps coverage data only once. In
contrast, unit-testing of llc spawns over 7500 processes in about
40s. This results in dumping 4GB of coverage data which signifi-
cantly contributes to the overall delay. Online merging of coverage
data might reduce this disk IO overhead. To give a better intuition,
we note that without online merging, llvm-cov would dump over
320GB of coverage (and profiling) data for the same benchmark.
The average memory and file size overhead introduced by bcov
are 22% and %16 respectively. We measure the memory overhead
relative to loadable ELF segments only since bcov does not affect
run-time heap and stack. Coverage data represents only 6% of the
memory overhead. It is worth noting that compiler optimizations
can force bcov to relocate more instructions. This might be due
to smaller basic blocks. However, our static instrumentation tech-
niques are effective in reducing the difference in relocation overhead
between debug and optimized builds as shown in Figure 7c.
RQ3: Jump table analysis. Evaluating sliced microexecution
requires comparing bcov with representative binary analysis tools.
However, it was not possible to comparewith BAP [10] and angr [35]
which are the leading academic tools. BAP does not have built-in
support for jump table analysis, while angr (v8.18.10) crashed on
1x 10x 20x 30x 40x 50x 60x 70x 80x
objdump
gas
python
perl
magick
xerces
opencv
ffmpeg
llc
Figure 6: Comparing the code size of our subjects to objdump (code
size about 339KB). Code size reported with GNU size utility.
opencv and llc binaries. For the remaining binaries, angr reported
significantly less jump tables compared to IDA Pro. Therefore, we
compare bcov only with IDA Pro (version 7.2). This should not affect
our results since IDA Pro is the leading industry disassembler.
Next we have to establish the ground truth of jump table ad-
dresses. Specifically, the addresses of their indirect jmp instructions.
This is challenging as compilers do not directly emit such informa-
tion. Therefore, we conduct a differential comparison. We observed
that bcov and IDA Pro agree on the majority of jump tables, includ-
ing their targets, so we manually examined the remaining cases
where they disagree. Both tools did not report false positives, i.e.,
they only missed jump tables. This is expected in bcov as repeated
microexecution inspires high confidence in its results. Therefore,
our ground truth is the union of jump table addresses recovered
by both tools. Figure 8 depicts the recovery percentages relative
to this ground truth of more than 46K jump tables. We control for
different factors affecting compilation. We observed that IDA Pro
delivers lower accuracy on clang binaries compared to gcc binaries
and its accuracy was affected by compiler optimizations. On the
other hand, bcov demonstrates high robustness across the board.
RQ4: Comparison with DBI tools. Pin and DynamoRIO (DR)
are the most popular DBI tools. Both act as a process virtual ma-
chines which instruments programs while JIT emitting instructions
to a code cache. This complex process creates the following sources
of overhead: (1) JIT optimization, and (2) client instrumentation.
For evaluating this overhead on our test suites, we installed the
latest stable releases of both tools, namely, Pin v3.11 and DR v7.1.
We then replaced each of our subjects with a wrapper executable.
In the case of shared libraries, we replaced their test harness with
our wrapper. The test system would now run the wrapper which
in turn executes its corresponding original binary but under the
control of a DBI tool. The wrapper reads a designated environment
variable to choose the current DBI tool.
Figure 9 depicts the performance overhead of Pin and DR with-
out client instrumentation. It also shows the overhead of DR after
enabling drcov, its code coverage client. Note that Pin does not
have a built-in coverage client. The overhead is measured relative
to original binaries and is averaged for four different release builds.
Both tools introduced regressions on perl and python. However, DR
made tests hung on perl and crashed on the python test suite. This
highlights the challenges of maintaining transparency in DBI tools.
Note that the DBI overhead of executable subjects is significantly
higher than that of shared libraries. This can be attributed to the
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Figure 7: Overhead of the any-node instrumentation policy. (a) performance overhead accounts for instrumentation and dumping coverage
data, (b) memory and file size overhead (c) distribution of memory overhead between code (relocated and coverage update) and coverage data.
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Figure 8: Normalized jump table analysis results in comparison to IDA Pro. (a) IDA Pro shows significant variance on clang binaries. (b) both
tools are comparable on gcc binaries. (c) varying the build type did not affect bcov.
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Figure 9: Comparing the performance overhead of Pin, DynamoRIO
(DR), and drcov, the code coverage client of DR. Omitted perl and
python as DRwas unable of completing their test suite runs. (*) The
actual overhead of Pin for llc is over 130x.
start-up delay which dominates in short-running tests. Our experi-
ments show that bcov provides significantly better performance,
transparency, and usability.
RQ5: Coverage report accuracy. We evaluate the coverage
reported by bcov by tracing binaries that are instrumented with
the any-node policy. This is necessary as comparing coverage of
original binaries to instrumented ones will introduce errors that
are caused by non-determinism. Initially, we obtained ground truth
traces using Intel PT (IPT). To this end, we collected about 2000
sample tests from our test suites. Running these tests produces
104GB of IPT data and 444MB of bcov coverage data. We used
the standard perf tracing facilities in kernel v4.15 and later kernel
v5.3. We tried many IPT configurations and restricted ourselves to
tests terminating in ≤ 5 seconds. Despite these efforts, we could not
reliably evaluate bcov due to non-deterministic loss in IPT data [24].
We then turned to drcov to obtain the ground truth. This DR
client dumps the address of encountered basic blocks (BB) heads,
i.e., first instruction. We leverage the fact that our instrumentation
does not modify BB heads. We expect BBs reported as covered by
bcov to appear in drcov’s trace. We consider these BBs to be true
positives (TP). If a BB reported by bcov was not found, it will be
marked as false-positive (FP). On the other hand, failing to report
the address of a tracked BB is a false-negative (FN). FPs and FNs are
considered errors in the reported coverage. Our evaluation method
is conservative given the potential CFG overapproximation. Also,
we take into account that drcov reports the heads of dynamic BBs.
This means that should A and B be consecutive BBs where A is
fallthrough, i.e., does not end with a branch, drcovmight only report
the head of A.
Our results are shown in Table 5. They are based on running
the test suites of subjects compiled with gcc-7 in release build.
The results are representative of other build types. The subjects
are instrumented with bcov and also run under control of DR’s
drcov. For each BB category we show the minimum and maximum
counts across all test processes. For example, the minimum number
of FP BBs among 7862 llc processes is 0, the maximum is 75. The
average precision and recall across all subjects are 99.97% and 99.95%
respectively. This suggests that the reported coverage errors are
practically negligible. Nevertheless, there is still room for further
improvement. Specifically, improving CFG precision and detour
hosting can reduce FPs and FNs respectively.
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss potential issues and limitations of bcov.
RISC ISA. Inserting detours is generally easier in RISC ISAs
thanks to their fixed instruction size. However, the addressing range
can be significantly lower than the ±2GB offered by x86-64. Note
that we patch each ELF module individually. This means that we
only need an addressing range that is large enough to reach our
patch code segment from the original code. For example, a range
of 60MB would be sufficient for our largest subject. AArch64 offers
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Module process # drcov size bcov size BB Inst. TP BB TP Inst. FP BB FP Inst. FN BB FN Inst.
xerces 80 16.31 4.32 116378 420096 26/21927 136/92144 0/9 0/31 2/16 2/16
magick 58 9.21 2.90 125521 521107 1441/20709 4988/83444 1/1 2/2 1/6 1/14
gas 1235 98.58 38.56 60511 220447 66/5015 302/19578 0/16 0/31 3/16 11/36
ffmpeg 3309 600.18 762.39 496404 3050228 4671/14489 19139/63591 1/4 1/51 3/14 4/25
llc 7862 5055.17 4176.16 1067151 4343021 8280/90952 80937/461656 0/75 0/271 0/249 0/570
Table 5: Evaluating the accuracy of bcov based on drcov traces.We show the number of processes spawned during testing, corresponding dump
sizes in MB, and the total number of BBs and their instructions in original binaries. Both tools dump one coverage file per process. Results
are categorized into true positives (TP), false positives (FP), and false negatives (FN). We give the minimum/maximum of each category across
all test processes. DR could not complete the test suite runs of perl and python. Omitted opencv as drcov’s data was invalid due to a bug.
a detour range of ±128MB which can accommodate the majority of
binaries. AArch32 offers just ±32MB, in comparison. In such case, a
single detour instruction might not be sufficient. Additional options
need to be investigated such as relocating functions, literal pools,
and changes to linker scripts.
In addition, we update coverage data using a single pc-relative
movwhich has a memory operand with 32-bit offset. Generally, emu-
lating the same functionality in RISC ISAs require more instructions
and clobbering of register(s). However, saving and restoring the
clobbered registers is not always necessary. A liveness analysis can
help us acquire registers with dead values. Similar analyses are
already implemented in DBI tools.
Limitations and threats to validity. The precision of the re-
covered CFG can affect the coverage reported by our tool. While the
implemented jump table and non-return analyses significantly in-
crease CFG precision, they are still not perfect. Our prototype might
miss jump tables, albeit only in few situations. Also, while our exper-
iments show that the non-return analysis in bcov is comparable to
IDA Pro, both tools face the challenge ofmay-return functions. Such
functions might not return to their caller depending on their argu-
ments. Function Perl__force_out_malformed_utf8_message in
perl is particularly noteworthy. In one binary, it is called 88 times
(out of 89 total) with the argument die_here set, i.e, will not return.
Developers can signal to the compiler that a particular call will
not return using __builtin_unreachable(). Such information is
not available in the binaries so we simply assume that all calls
to may-return functions are returning. Consequently, bcov might
spuriously report BBs following a may-return call as covered.
On another note, we believe that our subjects are representative
of C/C++ user-space software in Linux. However, generalizing our
results to other languages and platforms requires further investi-
gation. The simple mechanisms we use to implement detours and
update coverage are also applicable to system software. However,
special considerations might exist. Finally, our approach can not be
directly applied to dynamic code, e.g., self-modifying code.
9 RELATEDWORK
Instrumentation using trampolines is known since a long time. It
is typically used in limited applications such as function intercep-
tion [14]. We systematically use trampolines at fine granularity
to instrument basic blocks. Also, we are aggressive in exploiting
padding bytes and hosting detours. This allows us to avoid relocat-
ing entire functions which is the approach followed in PEBIL [25].
Recently, several works considered static instrumentation via
reassembly [15, 40] and recompilation [3]. In principle, they are
orthogonal to our approach as they allow us to inline coverage
update code in the recovered artifacts, namely, assembly and IR re-
spectively. However, they both face the challenge of distinguishing
references from scalars, an undecidable problem in general. Also,
they require additional engineering effort to fix relocated refer-
ences, e.g., CFI records. In comparison, trampolines allowed us to
seamlessly scale to large binaries in both C and C++. Also, they
make it easy to map analysis results back to original binaries.
The analysis of jump tables has been considered in several works.
A combination of pattern matching and data-flow analysis has been
proposed in [7, 28]. Cifuentes et al. [12] use backward slicing to
produce a slice that is converted to a canonical IR expression and
then checked against known jump table forms. A custom value-set
analysis using SMT solving has been implemented in JTR [13]. It
is applied after lifting instructions to LLVM IR. In contrast, our
approach semantically reasons about jump tables without manual
pattern matching. Also, we do not pay the performance and en-
gineering overhead of lifting instructions to an IR. Moreover, we
move beyond mere recovery to jump table instrumentation.
Tikir et al. [37] propose an approach to binary-level coverage
analysis and enhance its efficiency via probe pruning. It is the
closest related work to ours. However, our approaches differ in
a several aspects. First, they focus on dynamic coverage analysis
where they analyze, patch, and potentially, restore binaries at run-
time. In contrast, our approach is static which enables us to spend
more time optimizing instrumentation. Second, their work builds
on Dyninst [17], a generic binary instrumentation tool. However,
the generality of Dyninst comes at a considerable cost in terms
of overhead and complexity. For example, trampolines are orga-
nized into multiple levels. In comparison, we focus on the bare
minimum required for tracking code coverage. Consequently, bcov
provides better performance and transparency. Finally, the probe
pruning technique implemented in bcov is more optimal. A fact
that is acknowledged in their work.
10 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented bcov, a tool for binary-level coverage
analysis. We implemented a trampoline-based instrumentation ap-
proach and demonstrated that it can transparently scale to large
real-world programs in both C and C++. Our tool works directly on
x86-64 ELF binaries without compiler support. Improving efficiency
required an orchestrated effort where we leverage probe pruning,
improve CFG precision, and cope with the instruction-size variabil-
ity in x86-64 ISA. We make our tool and dataset publicly available
to foster further research in this area.
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